What Explains the Incidence of the Use of a Mandated Erosion and Sediment Control at
Residential Lots with Houses under Construction?

Abstract
To analyze infrequent compliance with regulation of stormwater discharge, we estimate a
random-cost model of the use of silt fence on a single-family lot under construction in an
urbanizing county of the Southeast. The probability of silt-fence use increases if the original
developer still owns the lot, a home owners association exists in the subdivision, or the
neighborhood has a multi-family dwelling. The probability decreases as the mean cost of the lots
and houses being built increase, heated floor space decreases, or the share of lots under
construction decreases. These results can help county officials to target inspection where noncompliance is likely and modify regulations to improve compliance.
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Introduction
Background
Urbanization of land use is increasingly common in the U.S. The area of developed land—
urban, built-up, and rural transportation land—increased 47.4%, from 72.8 million acres to 107.3
million acres, during 1982-2002 in the 48 contiguous states of the US (NRCS). Land
development apparently accelerated during 1982-2002 in the lower 48 states; the area of
developed land increased 18.8% during 1982-1992 but then 24.0% during 1992-2002 (NRCS).
However, although land-use urbanization accompanies economic growth, the process of land-use
conversion, particularly the removal of vegetation and disturbance of proportionally large areas
of soil, can adversely affect aquatic environments.
In the United States sediments impaired 13.2% of assessed rivers and streams in 1998 (EPA,
2000) and 12.1% of assessed rivers and streams in 2000 (EPA, 2002). Construction sites within
developed land areas, urban stream banks without adequate vegetation, and undeveloped areas
that are being developed are important sources of these sediments (EPA, 2002).
The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency regulates discharge of storm water from
construction sites. As required by 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act (CWA), the EPA in
November 1990 promulgated Phase I of a comprehensive national program to address storm
water discharges. Phase I requires construction operators to obtain coverage under a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for discharge of storm water runoff
into waters of the U.S. or into municipal separate stormwater sewer systems from sites where
construction activities disturb at least 5 acres of land or disturb less than 5 acres but are parts of

larger common plans or sales that disturb at least 5 acres (EPA, 2006 and 1997). These activities
include grading, clearing, excavating, and other earth moving processes. As required by the
same amendments to the CWA, the EPA in December 1999 promulgated Phase II of the NPDES
Storm Water Program. Phase II expanded the requirement of permit coverage to operators of
sites where construction activities disturb at least 1 acre of land. Regardless of Phase I or II,
construction operators—the developer and all contractors—must develop and implement storm
water pollution prevention plans (SWPPPs) to obtain permit coverage from NPDES permitting
authorities (EPA, 2006, pp. 7-8; EPA, 1997; Sadler, pp. 17-21).
Storm water pollution prevention plans must include locations and descriptions of erosion
and sediment controls (ESCs) that must be installed prior to construction and maintained in a
timely manner during construction until final stabilization of the site (Sadler, pp. 11-17 and 23).
ESCs restrain ―solid material, both mineral and organic, during a land disturbing activity to
prevent its transport out of the disturbed area by means of air, water, gravity, or ice‖ (DHEC,
2003, Appendix A, p. 9). In these plans, one of the most frequently promised ESCs at
construction sites is silt fence, or filter fabric (figure 1 and Paterson, p. 351).
Previous Research
In spite of regulations, silt fence and other commonly required erosion and sediment controls
(ESCs) are often not installed during construction of subdivisions. For example, silt fence was
not installed in 33% of the instances that were specified in ESC plans for construction sites in
North Carolina in 1989 (Paterson, p. 351). Sediment traps were not observed in 86% of the
instances that were specified in ESC plans for construction sites in Greenville County, South
Carolina in 2001 (Johns and Gillespie). Lack of required ESCs was particularly evident after the
infrastructural phase of construction (Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows).
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Social and biophysical scientists have extensively studied the reasons for the extent to which
farmers conserve soil on agricultural land (e.g., Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola) and how to
promote conservation (e.g., Setia and Osborn). However, reasons for non-use of promised ESCs
in storm water pollution prevention plans for non-agricultural activities that disturb land have not
been extensively studied. In a seminal paper, Burby and Paterson analyzed, among other things,
the effects of site characteristics, capacity and commitment of developers, and the enforcement
system on the degree to which sediment traps were actually installed as specified in approved
ESC plans at construction sites during the summer of 1989 in North Carolina. However, the
dependent variable in their model of compliant installation was a percentage. In such models,
similar to linear probability models, predicted compliance can exceed 100% or fall below 0%
and marginal effects of exogenous variables are constant, even near 100% and 0%.
In a recent paper (Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows), installation of silt fence on a lot during
house construction was strongly and negatively related to a change before construction in the
lot‘s ownership from the original developer to a builder or future homeowner. Of course, the
strength and significance of any possible effect of ownership change on the use of filter fabric
should be estimated with a statistical model and one that also incorporates other possible
determinants. In general, characteristics of the lot, house under construction, and subdivision in
which the lot is located might affect the benefits and costs, both psychological and financial, to a
developer and contractor of complying with the storm water pollution prevention plan.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the magnitude and significance of the effects of a
number of these characteristics on promised silt-fence use. To this end, we substantially
augmented the data from Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows and used them to estimate a logit
model of the probability that a contractor uses filter fabric on a particular lot. Information about
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the relative importance of determinants of required use of filter fabric can help government
officials to focus inspection on certain types of lots, houses, or subdivisions during construction
and, if necessary, revise regulation of stormwater runoff.
Methods and Models
Data Sources and Variables
Information about the presence of silt fence came from an ocular census of all, 184, singlefamily, residential lots with houses under construction in fourteen subdivisions of Richland
County, a predominantly urban area in South Carolina, during September 2003 (Loew,
Haselbach, and Meadows; also table 1). In their review of the county-approved storm water
pollution prevention plans, Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows found that silt fences were required
at all 184 lots but were observed at only 50. In our paper, SILTFENCE equals one if a visited lot
with a house under construction had any required silt fence and zero if it did not (table 2).
From their review in late 2003 of the Tax Assessor‘s on-line records of 330 unimproved lots
in the same 14 subdivisions, Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows found that ownership of 75.5% of
the lots had changed (table 1). In our paper, OWNERCHG equals one for a lot with a house
under construction if the developer, who was responsible for the storm water pollution
prevention plan, sold the unimproved lot to a contractor, builder, or a future homeowner prior to
construction of the house. Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows did not assign identification to
individual lots that were visited or reviewed. Nonetheless, there is certainty that the value of
OWNERCHG for 166 of the 184 visited lots is accurate because the original developer sold all
reviewed lots in 11 subdivisions and none of the reviewed lots in the other two subdivisions in
which the 166 lots were located (table 1). The developer of subdivision D sold two thirds of the
18 reviewed lots to someone else. Which two thirds of the 18 lots in subdivision D were sold is
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not known. However, deleting observations would eliminate potentially valuable information.
Thus, in spite of preliminary evidence to the contrary in other subdivisions and to be agnostic,
we assumed no correlation between ownership change and silt-fence use in this subdivision.
Hence, OWNERCHG equals one for two of the three lots for which SILTFENCE equals one and
also equals one for 10 of the 15 lots for which SILTFENCE equals zero in subdivision D.
The webpage of the Richland County Assessor‘s Office was also the source of information
about real estate in a subdivision. PRICEHL is the mean price that homeowners paid for houses
being built and lots in a particular subdivision around the time of the survey (table 2).
HTDFLOOR is the mean floor space of heated portions of the houses under construction in the
subdivision during same period (table 2). LOTSIZE is the mean size of lots on which houses
were being constructed in the subdivision around the time of the survey (table 2).
To maximize the degree of correspondence between the lots that were surveyed in September
2003 and these three variables, we collected on-line information about all of the lots with houses
that were completed within three to nine months after the date of the visit in September. After
following this procedure, if the number of tax records was still less than 40% of the number of
lots visited in a particular subdivision, we then collected on-line information about all of the lots
with houses that were completed three months prior to September 2003. (See table 1 for the size
of the sample of lots in a particular subdivision and the months during which construction of
houses on unimproved lots in the subdivision‘s sample was finished.)
We also gathered information about general characteristics of the subdivisions where lots
under construction were located. HOA equals one for all lots with single-family houses under
construction in a subdivision with a home owners association (table 2). A subdivision has a
home owners association if property tax records indicate that an association owns a pool,

5

clubhouse, or common area. MULTI equals one for all single-family lots under construction at
in subdivisions that have at least one apartment, condominium, or other type of multi-family
housing (table 2). Each of the fourteen subdivisions was revisited in August 2005 to confirm the
on-line Assessor‘s information about the presence of a home owners association, a multi-family
dwelling, or both. CONSHARE equals the number of lots under construction in a subdivision
when silt-fence use was investigated divided by the total number of lots in the subdivision.
Socio-Economic Model
Our socio-economic model of silt-fence use is based on the following assumptions and facts.
Assume that developers and contractors want to earn profits and also care about their business
reputations. Costs to builders of silt-fence use are primarily installation costs. Expenses for 3 ft.
high polypropylene filter fabric, labor to install it, overhead, and profit were $0.76 and $1.30 per
linear foot under ideal and adverse conditions in Columbia, South Carolina in Jan. 2004
(Murphy, p. 37; Waier, p. 53). The expected value of fines is one cost to builders of non-use of
silt fence. Civil penalties for violation of the NPDES Stormwater Program and South Carolina‘s
Sediment, Erosion, and Flood Control Program can amount to as much as $10,000 and $1,000
per day (DHEC, 2001). Costs of non-use of silt fence also include expected costs of additional
bond payments or cleanup, all of which reduce profits. Publication of fines can also harm a
builder‘s reputation with developers and others in the community. For similar reasons, eroded
sediments on adjacent lots, roads in front of lots, and nearby sidewalks can also hurt the
reputation of a builder or the developer. Assume that a builder installs filter fabric on a lot as
promised in the SWPPP if the financial costs of silt-fence use, E(Cu), are less than or equal to the
expected fines, loss of reputation, and other expected costs of non-use, E(Cn). In other words,
the builder‘s decision rule is to use silt fence if E(Cn) ≥ E(Cu).
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Econometric Model
Although the approximate unit costs of silt-fence installation in Columbia, South Carolina
are known, there is no available or readily obtainable information about the complete financial
and reputational costs to a builder of his or her use and non-use of silt fence on a particular lot in
a particular subdivision of this study area in September 2003. To adapt random utility models
(e.g., Train) to our problem, let E (Cti )  Cti  ti , i = u for use or n for non-use of silt fence, and t
= 1, …, T, the number of individual lots investigated. Cti represents the deterministic and
knowable portion of the expected costs of choice i and ti represents an independently and
identically distributed random, but unobservable, portion of the expected costs of choice i at the
t-th lot that, on average, has no effect on them. Given these random costs, the probability in the
mind of the researcher that a builder uses silt fence on a particular lot t is
Pt u  Pr(Ctu   tu  Ct n   tn )  Pr( tu   tn  Ct n  Ctu )  Pr( t  Ct )

Let Ct  X t , in which X t is a 1 x K vector of lot, house, and subdivision variables that affect
the difference in costs to a builder between non-use and use of silt fence on the lot and β is a K x
1 vector of marginal effects exogenous variables on the difference in deterministic costs. If t is
a logistic random variable, then Pt u 

exp( X t )
.
1  exp( X t )

Let yt = 1 for use or 0 for non-use of silt fence on the t-th lot. Given the logistic probabilities
and 184 observations of lots, the unconstrained likelihood function is
L   Pt
184

t 1

 1  P 

u 1 yt

u yt

t

 exp( X t β ) 

  
t 1  1  exp( X t β ) 
184

yt



1


 1  exp( X t β ) 

1 yt

The parameter vector β and the standard errors of the estimator of β were estimated with the
Newton-Raphson algorithm in the LOGIT procedure of TSP Version 5.0 to maximize this
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likelihood function (Hall and Cummins). The parameter estimator is consistent, asymptotically
efficient, and asymptotically normally distributed (Judge et al.).
 ln Lu 

The scaled R , or SR  1  
 ln Lc 
2

2

 ( 2 / N ) ln Lc

, is a relatively new measure of the goodness of

fit of dichotomous dependent variables (Estrella). In this formula „Lc‟ refers to the maximized
value of the constrained likelihood function in which K-1 parameters, all except the constant, are
fixed at 0 and „Lu‟ refers to the maximized value of L, the unconstrained likelihood function. In
contrast to older measures of fit, the scaled R2 “may be interpreted intuitively in a similar way to
R2 in the linear regression context” (Estrella, p. 198). The likelihood ratio statistic, LR = 2(lnLu
– lnLc), is used to test whether at least one exogenous variable, other than the intercept, in the
logit model affects the probability of silt-fence use. Given the null hypothesis that no exogenous
variable, except the constant, affects the likelihood of use, this statistic is asymptotically
distributed as a chi-square random variable with K-1 degrees of freedom (Judge et al.).
Note that the marginal effect of the k-th continuous exogenous variable on expected cost
differences, βk, is also the marginal effect of this variable on the natural logarithm of the odds of

 Pu 
silt-fence use on the t-th lot, ln  t n  . However, the marginal effect of the k-th continuous
 Pt 
exogenous variable on the probability of silt-fence use on a particular lot is

Pt u
  k Pt u Pt n .
X t ,k

Let X -kt and β-k represent the 1 x K-1 and K-1 x 1 vectors of exogenous variables for the t-th
lot and associated marginal effects on cost differences but not the k-th variable and effect. The
discrete effect of the k-th exogenous dummy variable on the probability of silt-fence use at the tth lot is Pktu  Pukt 

exp( X  kt β k   k )
exp( X  kt β k )

.
1  exp( X  kt β  k   k ) 1  exp( X  kt β  k )
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Results
Parameter estimates, standard errors, t-statistics, p-values, and sample-mean marginal and
discrete effects of the variables in the logit model are presented in table 3. The scaled R2 is 50%
(table 3). Furthermore, 87.5% of the estimated probabilities of silt-fence use on a particular lot
are either greater than 0.5 for lots where the builder actually used silt fence or less than 0.5 for
lots where the contractor did not. The p-value associated with the likelihood ratio statistic is
extremely low (table 3). Thus, in addition to the constant, some of the exogenous variables
statistically affect the probability of silt-fence use. Moreover, two-sided p-values of t-statistics
indicate that each of the exogenous variables, except one, statistically matters.
The lot characteristic and two of the three means of lot-house variables in the subdivision are
statistically significant. The probability that a builder uses silt fence on a lot with a house under
construction is 21 percentage points lower, on average, if the original developer no longer owns
the lot. The probability of use decreases 39 percentage points, on average, in response to a US
$100,000 increase in the average cost of lots with houses being built. The probability increases
4.3 percentage points, on average, in response to a 100 ft2 increase in the mean heated floor
space of the houses under construction.
The three general characteristics of the residential development are also statistically
significant. In particular, the probability that a builder uses filter fabric on a lot is 32 percentage
points higher, on average, in a subdivision with a home owners association (HOA=1) than in a
subdivision without one. This probability is 65 percentage points higher, on average, in
subdivisions with mixed residential housing (MULTI=1) than in developments with only singlefamily dwellings. Finally, the probability that a builder uses silt fence on a lot increases 17
percentage points, on average, if the share of the number of lots on which houses are under
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construction in the total number of lots in a subdivision increases by 10 percentage points.
Discussion
The logit model predicts the probability of silt-fence use—conditional on characteristics of
the lot with a house under construction, all such lots and the houses being built on them, and the
subdivision in which the lots are located—better than the sample proportion does.
If the original developer still owns a particular lot, he shares responsibility with the builder
for compliance with the storm water pollution prevention plan (SWPPP). As a result, the
developer is more likely to monitor the builder‘s use of silt fence. If the builder is hired by the
developer of a lot, the builder is more likely to feel responsible to the developer and comply with
the SWPPP. However, if a builder owns a residential lot or is hired by the homeowner, the
builder might not have filed a separate SWPPP or might be ignorant of the law and, in either
case, will not be monitored by the original developer.
If the mean price of houses under construction and the lots in a subdivision increases, given
the mean lot size and heated floor space, the market cost of a house that is built on a particular
lot is also likely, on average, to increase. Increases in the number of indoor amenities and the
quality of building materials are two reasons why the costs of constructing a house with a given
heated floor space on a particularly sized lot increase. Whatever the reason, the more expensive
is the house being built, the more the builder might be able afford a fine for lack of a silt fence.
As the mean heated floor space of houses under construction increases, for given lot sizes,
the amount of disturbed soil from the lots tends to increase because surface areas of foundations
grow for larger floors or the depths of foundations grow for finished basements. If the amount of
disturbed soil per lot under construction increases, the costs of both use and non-use of silt fence
increase. On the one hand, the costs of use increase because the builder would need to install
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more or better silt fence than he otherwise would. On the other hand, as the potential amount of
eroded sediments on sidewalks and roads increases, so does the potential damage to a builder‘s
reputation. As the expected costs of non-use increase, the builder is more likely to use silt fence.
Our results indicate that the effect of an increase in heated floor space on the costs of non-use of
filter fabric dominate the effect on the costs of use.
For similar reasons, lot size is also probably correlated with the costs of use and non-use of
filter fabric. As the size of the lot increases, the amount of silt fence that should be installed
tends to increase but so does the potential amount of soil that erodes off the lot. One possible
reason why LOTSIZE has no significant effect on the probability of silt-fence use is because the
variable is strongly, positively, and significantly correlated with HTDFLOOR and PRICEHL.
The insignificance of LOTSIZE is broadly consistent with the finding of Burby and Paterson (pp.
762 and 764) that the area of the residential or commercial construction site did not affect the
degree to which promised sediment traps were installed.
A builder is more likely to install silt fence when a homeowner‘s association exists because,
we hypothesize, neighbors are relatively more organized and have a greater financial and
emotional stake in the quality of the neighborhood. Hence, in such a neighborhood, a neighbor
is more likely to complain if the builder does not install a silt fence on any lot under
construction. The builder is more likely to use silt fence in a subdivision with at least one multifamily dwelling because the number of people who notice soil on sidewalks or in the road if the
builder does not use silt fence is greater in subdivisions with multi-family dwellings.
An increase in CONSHARE, the number of lots with houses under construction relative to
the total number of lots in a subdivision, implies increases in the frequency and magnitude per
resident, ceteris paribus, of potential and actual adverse impacts of soil that erodes onto
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sidewalks, streets, or adjacent yards. If so, residents are more likely to complain or complain
more strongly about the lack of erosion and sediment control.
Why do increases in the likelihood of an individual complaint, the potential magnitude of a
complaint, and the number of potential complainers make a builder more likely to comply with
the silt-fence portion of the SWPPP? First, the increases strengthen the intrinsic motivation for
use, i.e., raise the expected damage to reputation of non use. Second, these increases probably
induce the County Engineer to inspect more frequently and, thereby, strengthen the extrinsic
motivation for use, i.e., raise the expected financial cost of non-use. Our second argument is
consistent with the finding that the percentage of sediments traps actually installed as specified in
the ESC plan increased as the frequency of monthly inspections of construction sites increased
(Burby and Paterson, pp. 764).
Implications for Research and Policy
Our socio-economic, random-cost model undoubtedly simplifies the reality of, and the reasons
for, the use of silt fence to control the movement of sediments off lots with houses under
construction. The probabilistic model was estimated with data about characteristics of lots,
houses, and subdivisions in only one fast-growing, urban county of one southeastern state.
Whether a developer‘s sale of a lot to a builder or future homeowner reduces the probability of
silt-fence use and whether the presence of a homeowner‘s association or multi-family dwelling
in a subdivision increases this probability in other counties in South Carolina and other states are
questions for future research. Information about individual lot sizes, costs of individual lots and
houses under construction, and the heated floor spaces of houses is also needed to determine
whether these lot- and house-specific variables affect the probability of silt-fence use in other
places as subdivision-specific means do in this study area. In the past year Richland County‘s

12

stormwater officials have become certified as SWPPP inspectors and code enforcement officers
(Valavala). Whether the probability of silt-fence use has increased as a result of completion of
official training and the on-site power to impose fines is another important question.
Our results enable us to suggest that government officials in this county and possibly other
similar ones could improve the likelihood that builders comply with storm water pollution
prevention plans if they target inspections of lots and residential developments with certain
characteristics. In particular, inspectors should target lots with houses under construction in
subdivisions where the developer has sold the lots and no home owner association or multifamily dwelling exists. In this and possibly other similar counties, any policy that discourages
the transfer of lot ownership from developers who are originally responsible for SWPPPs will
probably increase the probability of silt-fence use. Moreover, any policy that encourages the
formation of home owners associations and permits at least one multi-family dwelling with
single-family ones in a subdivision will also probably have positive effects on use of filter fabric.
Finally, inspectors should also focus on subdivisions where relatively expensive houses are
under construction and lots of houses being built are relatively small shares of all lots.
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0.245

214,638

2,670

3, 5

Yes

No

Number of
Unimproved
Lots with
New Owners1

Number of
Improved and
Unimproved
Lots1

Mean Lot
Size
(acres)

Mean Price of
Newly Built
House and Lot
(US$)

Mean Heated
Floor Space
(sq. ft.)

A

0 of 8

15 of 15

110

0.167

347,095

B

0 of 8

15 of 15

123

0.225

C

1 of 29

20 of 20

203

D

3 of 18

12 of 18

E

0 of 6

F

Subdivision

Number of
Lots under
Construction
with Silt
Fence1

N
0 of 30
25 of 25
396
1
Data come from Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows.

2

0.153
94,113
1,363
19, 3
No
No
The codes refer to these time periods: 1) 9/8/2003-12/31/2003, 2) 9/10/2003-

12/31/2003, 3) 9/22/2003-12/31/2003, 4) 9/11/2003-6/30/2004, and 5) 7/1/2003-6/30/2004.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for lot, house, and subdivision variables
Mean

Standard

VARIABLE

(n=184)

Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

SILTFENCE

0.272

0.446

0

1

OWNERCHG

0.799

0.402

0

1

PRICEHL ($100,000)

1.88777

0.93986

0.78875

4.15104

HTDFLOOR (100 ft2)

21.00

6.82

11.86

34.48

LOTSIZE (acres)

0.243

0.119

0.082

0.624

HOA

0.299

0.459

0

1

MULTI

0.152

0.360

0

1

CONSHARE (percent)

15.27

8.04

2.80

30
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Table 3: Logit model of the probability of the use of silt fence on a residential lot
Parameter

Standard

VARIABLE

Mean Marginal or
t-statistic

p-value

Estimate

Error

Discrete Effects

CONSTANT

-6.937

2.856

-2.429

[.015]

OWNERCHG

-1.611

0.673

-2.393

[.017]

-0.214

PRICEHL

-3.889

1.274

-3.052

[.002]

-0.391

HTDFLOOR

0.425

0.192

2.211

[.027]

0.043

LOTSIZE

2.046

4.256

0.481

[.631]

0.206

HOA

2.955

0.795

3.718

[.000]

0.322

MULTI

5.124

1.417

3.616

[.000]

0.647

CONSHARE

0.171

0.054

3.160

[.002]

0.017

The log likelihood is -59.4101, the scaled R2 is 0.5011, and the likelihood ratio statistic for test
of non-zero slopes is 96.4528 (p-value < 0.001).
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Figure 1: Use of silt fence on a residential lot under construction in study area
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